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bei jedem Neueintrag Signatur nicht vergessen:  --- //[[hetzer@zfl-berlin.org|Susanne Hetzer]] 2008/11/27 11:36//

===== Internes Material =====

==== Begriffsgeschichtliche Literatur ====

  * Baumgartner, H. M., Krafft, F., Nobis, H. M.: (Art.) Art, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Hg.v. J. Ritter. Bd. 1, Basel/Stuttgart, 1971, Sp. 525 - 531.

|**Inhalt**: Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Artikel beginnend bei Platon und Aristoteles (ausführliche Erörterung des letzteren in §2). Für den Artbegriff bis in die Neuzeit hinein bestimmend ist die Einleitungsschrift in die aristotelischen Kategorien des Porhyrius. Darin die klassischen Lehrstücke über Gattung und Art, sowie ihr Verhältnis. Noch Kant bleibt mit seinem Artbegriff ("der niedere Begriff in Ansehung eines höheren" im Rahmen dieser Tradition, erweitert den Begriff aber um die Spezifikation in eine fortschreitende Reihe von Unterarten. Die 'Klassenlogik' bringt eine endgültige Eliminierung "metaphysisch-inhaltlicher, intensionaler Elemente und der Interpretation der Art als echter Teilklasse einer umfassenden Klasse". Unter §3 die Erörterung des biologischen Artbegriffes vom Mittelalter ausgehend (Arbegriff in Philosophie- u. Bibeltradition). Darstellung v.a. der theologisch fundierten Definition des Artbegriffes (Augustinus (bedeutend: statischer Artbegriff (Lehre von den 'Keimgründen) der sich bis in die späte Neuzeit durchhält); Basilius; Ambrosius; Augustin). Nachfolgend ein Exkurs in die Bedeutung des Artbegriffes in der islamischen Philosophie, sodann die Erörterung der Begriffsbedeutung in der europäischen Neuzeit. Hier weiterhin bestimmend die aristotelische Tradition (Andrea Cesalpino; John Ray). Linné führt die binäre Nomenklatur ein und unterscheidet ein künstliches von einem natürlichen Klassifizierungssystem. Bei ihm die Entwicklung von einem statischen zu einem dynamischen Artbegriff (zwischen 'Systema naturae' von 1735 und 1766). Verbesserungen des Linnéschen Systems von Curvier, der zunächst weiterhin davon ausgeht, das Arten konstant sind. Lamarck und Geoffroy treten für die Veränderlichkeit der Arten ein. Curvier und C.H. Lyell ('Principles of Geology') beeinflussen Darwins Evolutionstheorie die von einer Veränderlichkeit der Arten sicher ausgeht, wobei der statische Artbegriff endgültig aufgegeben wird (Deszendenztheorie). Kritische Erörterung und Erweiterung des Darwinschen Begriffes im 20. Jhd. durch Dobzhansky, Merxmüller und Hedwig Conrad Martius. Jüngster Literatureintrag 1969.| 

  
=== Sonstige Literatur ===
 
  * Ereshefsky, Marc: Species, taxonomy, and systematics. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 2007, S. 403-427. 

|Abstract: Conceptual issues in biological taxonomy often straddle the boundary betweenbiology and philosophy. Consider questions over the nature of species. Are speciesnatural kinds or individuals? Does 'species' refer to a category in nature or is itmerely a useful device for organizing our biological knowledge? These questionsinvolve elements of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Thesequestions also turn on empirical information and biological theory. When we askabout the nature of species are we asking a philosophical or biological question? The answer is 'both.'|

  

  * Kinch, Michael Paul: Geographical distribution and the origin of life: The development of early nineteenth-century British explanations. Journal of the History of Biology 13/1, 1980, S. 91-119. 

|Abstract: By the 1840s and 1850s biogeographical theory had polarized into two opposing views — both of which had their origins in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. At issue in this polarization was the question of God's involvement with His creation. At one end of the spectrum were Sclater, Agassiz, Kirby, and others who saw a neatly designed world in which geographical distributions were planned and executed by the hand of God at creation. For most of these naturalists, organisms were created en masse within the regions they now occupy. Disjunct distributions were proof to them that God had indeed created species in situ as many individuals. These naturalists hoped to reveal God's biogeographical plan by discovering His regions of creation. They had hoped to demonstrate a neatly devised set of regions of creation which might be applicable to all creatures, but in attempting to do so, they arrived at conflicting sets of delineations — thus helping to undermine their conceptions of nature in which design (both idealist and utilitarian) played an important part. At the other end of the biogeographical spectrum were the theoretical ideas of Prichard and Lyell, who viewed a more remote God — one who allowed His creation to be shaped and modified by secondary laws. Lyell in particular wished to leave considerations of design aside, hoping to demonstrate that the shape of the present creation is due to natural laws. Prichard and Lyell saw God's role in the creation of species (and distributions) as being extremely limited. In fact, the regions of creation seen today are in actuality only natural artifacts produced by migrations and barriers. They saw distributions being in constant flux, as was the rest of nature.\\ Those supporting the views of Prichard and Lyell spent a great deal of effort in attempting to remove a major obstacle in their paths — disjunct distributions. If disjunct distributions were indeed the products of separate creative acts, as Sclater and others claimed, then the arguments of Prichard and Lyell would be negated. For if the creation of a species was shown to be the product of multiple creations, then what was the need of migrations and dispersal mechanisms? Also at stake, of course, was the concept of species based upon generation. Darwin was well aware that if the supernatural implications of disjunct distributions could not be refuted, then his evolutionary system — founded upon a species concept based on descent — would be in peril.\\ A further barrier to the acceptance of the Prichard/Lyell view was the fact that those sympathetic to a nonsupernatural explanation of disjunct distributions could not agree upon a natural explanation for those anomalies, and an internal debate between naturalists within this group raged for decades. \\ By 1859 a biogeographical stalemate had occurred. Sclater and others, supporting their static view of nature, continued to look for regions of creation, pointing to disjunct distributions in support of their arguments, while those favorable to the views of Prichard and Lyell continued to search for natural explanations for such biogeographical anomalie.|


  * Stamos, David N.: Pre-Darwinian Taxonomy and Essentialism – A Reply to MaryWinsor. Biology & Philosophy 20/1, 2005, S. 79-96. 

|Abstract: Mary Winsor argues against the received view that pre-Darwinian taxonomy was characterized mainly by essentialism. She argues, instead, that the methods of pre-Darwinian taxonomists, in spite of whatever their beliefs, were that of clusterists, so that the received view, propagated mainly by certain modern biologists and philosophers of biology, should at last be put to rest as a myth. I argue that shes right when it comes to higher taxa, but wrong when it comes the most important category of all, the species category.|

  * Thomas A.C. Reydon: On the nature of the species problem and the four meanings of ‘species’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36/1, 2005, S. 135-158. 

|Abstract: Present-day thought on the notion of species is troubled by a mistaken understanding of the nature of the issue: while the species problem is commonly understood as concerning the epistemology and ontology of one single scientific concept, I argue that in fact there are multiple distinct concepts at stake. An approach to the species problem is presented that interprets the term ‘species’ as the placeholder for four distinct scientific concepts, each having its own role in biological theory, and an explanation is given of the concepts involved. To illustrate how these concepts are commonly conflated, two widely accepted ideas on species are criticized: species individualism and species pluralism. I argue that by failing to distinguish between the four concepts and their particular roles in contemporary biological theory, these ideas stand in the way of a final resolution of the species problem.|


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